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The Contribution of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to
International Law
Helmut Tuerk*
Summary
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea imposed
an obligation on States Parties to settle disputes by peaceful means and,
in particular, also provides for compulsory procedures with binding
decisions. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, composed
of twenty-one judges representing the principal legal systems of the
world, is one of the means for the settlement of disputes entailing such
decisions. The Tribunal is open not only to States, but also to
international organizations and, under certain conditions, to natural or
legal persons. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal, in principle, includes any
dispute relating to the law of the sea, subject to certain limitations and
optional exceptions. The Tribunal has compulsory jurisdiction in two
instances: provisional measures and the prompt release of vessels and
crews.
In its eleven years of existence the Tribunal has established a
reputation for the expeditious and efficient management of cases and
already has made a substantial contribution to the development of
international law, including international environmental law. The total
offifteen cases heard so far-of which twelve were fisheries related and
thirteen were introduced on the basis of the Tribunal's compulsory
jurisdiction-may not appear impressive. This record, however, does not
compare unfavourably to that of other international judicial bodies in the
initial stages of their existence.
* The author is a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in
Hamburg. For many years he has served as a member of the Austrian delegation to the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and also has represented his
country at subsequent meetings and negotiations in that field. Opinions expressed in this
Article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the Tribunal as a whole.
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I. Introduction
On November 16, 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of December 10, 1982,' entered into force after eight years of
protracted and arduous negotiations. This Convention is one of the most
important treaties ever elaborated under the auspices of the United
Nations,2 as it provides a well-nigh universally agreed comprehensive
regime for the seas, regulating all ocean space, its uses and its resources.3
At present, 154 States and the European Community are parties to the
treaty,4 and this number will probably increase.
The impetus for what has rightly been called a "Constitution for the
Oceans" 5 was the Memorandum of Malta, presented at the United
Nations General Assembly in 1967. This Memorandum proposed that
the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
be declared "the common heritage of mankind," not subject to national
appropriation, and reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.6 Such an
overarching international instrument might never have been negotiated
without this initial spark.
Since its entry into force, the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea has undoubtedly played a major role in bringing order to
the oceans. In particular, the Convention establishes a clear and
universal framework of coastal state maritime jurisdiction. The causes
for many maritime disputes between States have thus been eliminated.
At the same time, however, the Convention contains an innovative
system for the settlement of such disputes. It has been observed that it is
one of the most far-reaching and complex systems of dispute settlement
found anywhere in international law. There can be no doubt that the
underlying rationale for the creation of such a system was the wish to
safeguard the many delicate compromises enshrined in the Convention
and to secure its uniform interpretation and application.7
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-historical-perspective.h
tm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
2. See id.
3. See Judge Rildiger Wolfrum, President, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 2 (Oct.
20, 2006).
4. See An International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
5. T.T.B. KOH, A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks made by the President of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX,
E.83.V.5, p. xxxiii.
6. Memorandum, The Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/6695 (Aug. 17, 1967).
7. R. CHURCHILL, Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement
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The Convention on the Law of the Sea created three important
institutions: the International Seabed Authority in Jamaica,8 the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg9 and the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,' ° which meets in
New York. Since the oceans and seas cover almost seventy-one percent
of the Earth's surface, the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has the largest
geographical jurisdiction in the world, apart from the International Court
of Justice.
Part XV of the Convention deals with the settlement of disputes. I'
It imposes an obligation on States Parties to settle disputes by peaceful
means and, in particular, also provides for compulsory procedures with
binding decisions. 12 Annex VI of the Convention contains the Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which is one of the
four means for the settlement of disputes entailing such decisions. The
other alternative means are the International Court of Justice, an arbitral
tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention,
and a special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII for certain categories of
disputes-fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine
environment, marine scientific research or navigation, including
pollution from vessels and dumping. 13
II. Jurisdiction, Composition and Structure of the Tribunal
1 4
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which became
System of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea During its First Decade, in THE LAW
OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS, 388, 388 (D. Freestone, R. Barnes & D. M. Ong
eds., 2006).
8. See International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
9. See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/
start2_en.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
10. See Oceans and Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/
commissionpurpose.htm#Purpose (last visited February 23, 2008).
11. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. XV, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Convention].
12. Id.; see also T. TREVES, The Exclusive Economic Zone and the Settlement of
Disputes, in THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982-2000: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF STATE PRACTICE, 79,
79 (E. Franck & P. Gautier eds., 2003) (underlining the fact that compared to the
provisions concerning the settlement of disputes "contained in other 'codification
conventions,' the system for the settlement of disputes in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea is remarkably different, because it provides, as a rule, the
possibility of compulsory settlement").
13. See Convention, supra note 11, at pt. XV, art. 287.
14. See Convention, supra note 11, at Annex VI; see also International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, Registry, A Guide to Proceedings before the Tribunal, 3-9 (2006),
available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) [hereinafter A
Guide to Proceedings before the Tribunal].
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operational on October 1, 1996, is the specialized international judicial
body established for the settlement of disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
and for rendering advisory opinions. 15 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
in principle, includes any dispute relating to the law of the sea, such as
disputes relating to maritime boundaries, fisheries, sea pollution or
marine scientific research. Its jurisdiction is, however, subject to certain
limitations and optional exceptions. 16  These limitations relate to the
exercise of certain discretionary powers by the coastal States; States
Parties also have the right to exclude several categories of disputes, such
as those relating to sea boundaries or military activities, from
compulsory settlement procedures. 17  The Tribunal has compulsory
jurisdiction in two instances: article 290 regarding provisional measures
and article 292 concerning the prompt release of vessels and crews.18
The Convention does not contain any provision conferring advisory
jurisdiction on the Tribunal as such, which may, however, on the basis of
Article 21 of its Statute give an advisory opinion on a legal question if
this is provided for by an international agreement related to the purposes
of the Convention conferring jurisdiction on it. 19 Thus far, no use has
been made of that interesting option in any international instrument.2 °
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal may also be derived from relevant
clauses included in international agreements relating to the law of the
sea.2' At present, there are nine international agreements-six of which
are fisheries-related--containing provisions making specific reference to
the dispute settlement procedures of Part XV of the Convention and
15. See P. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO, ITLOS: The First Six Years, in 6 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, 185, 185 (Armin von Bogdandy & Riidiger
Wolfrum eds., 2002); see also L. DOLLIVER M. NELSON, Reflections on the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS,
28, 35 (David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds., 2006).
16. Convention, supra note 11, at pt. XV, arts. 297-98.
17. See id.
18. See id. at pt. XV, arts. 290, 292.
19. H. CAMrNOS, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: An Overview of
its Jurisdictional Procedure, in 5 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS, no. 1, 13, 22 (Eduardo Valencia-Ospina ed., 2006).
20. See R. Wolfrum, The Tenth Anniversary of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, II ROMANIAN J. INT'L L., no. 3, 76-77 (2002) (pointing out that the
advisory function of the Tribunal is a significant innovation in the international judicial
system and may offer a potential alternative for those seeking a non-binding opinion on a
legal question or an indication as to how a particular dispute may be solved through
direct negotiations. Such proceedings could be of particular assistance to parties to a
dispute in the process of reaching a solution by negotiation, for example, in maritime
delimitation cases).
21. A Guide to Proceedings before the Tribunal, supra note 14, at 6.
[Vol. 26:2
2007] THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 293
conferring therewith jurisdiction on the Tribunal.22 The best known are
the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks of 199523 and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the
Underwater Cultural Heritage of 2001 .24 The most recent example is the
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks 25 adopted in
May 2007 at a diplomatic conference held by the International Maritime
26Organization. With respect to these agreements, the procedures of Part
XV apply whether a party to the agreement is a State Party to the
Convention on the Law of the Sea or not. The inclusion of such
jurisdictional clauses has thus become an established practice and it can
only be of benefit to the parties if such clauses are included in every new
maritime agreement that is being negotiated.27
Finally, Article 22 of the Statute allows the Tribunal to exercise
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
treaties which are already in force, and concern the subject-matter
covered by the Convention, provided that all the parties to that treaty so
agree.28
The law to be applied by the Tribunal comprises the Convention,
and other rules of international law not incompatible with it.29 This does
not, however, preclude the Tribunal from holding jurisdiction to
determine a matter ex aequo et bono,30 if the parties so agree. Decisions
are final and the parties to the dispute are required to comply with them.
The decisions, however, have no binding force beyond the parties to the
dispute.31 Nevertheless, they may be quite significant for the
22. See Doo-Young Kim, Deputy Registrar, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement to the First Meeting of the Regional Fishery Bodies-Secretariats Network, 4
(Mar. 13, 2007).
23. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995,
2167 U.N.T.S. 88.
24. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 41
I.L.M. 40 (2002).
25. Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, May 18, 2007, 46
I.L.M. 697.
26. Judge Riidiger Wolfrum, President, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 7 (June 19, 2006); see also A Guide to Proceedings before the Tribunal, supra note
14, at Annex 1 (offering a list of these agreements).
27. Wolfrum, supra note 26, at 8.
28. See id.
29. See Convention, supra note 11, at pt. XV, art. 293.
30. D. R. ROTHWELL, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and Marine
Environmental Protection: Expanding the Horizons of International Oceans Governance,
17 Ocean Y.B. 33 (2003).
31. See Convention, supra note 11, at pt. XV, art. 296.
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development of the law of the sea in general, and may, in addition,
influence the future interpretation of this body of law. It should also be
noted that parties have no recourse to appeal a decision of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal is, at present, the largest world-wide judicial body,
being composed of twenty-one judges, who are recognized experts in the
field of the law of the sea. They are elected by the States Parties to the
Convention for a term of nine years, whereby the term of one-third of the
members of the Tribunal expires every three years. The composition of
the Tribunal must ensure adequate representation of the principal legal
systems of the world, and an equitable geographical distribution. The
States Parties-which hold annual meetings in New York-have agreed
to elect five judges each from Africa and Asia, four each from Latin
American and Caribbean States, as well as Western European and Other
States, and three from the Group of Eastern European States. This
composition of the Tribunal clearly shows that added weight has been
given to developing countries in comparison with the International Court
of Justice,33 where, in practice, judges from the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council occupy one-third of the fifteen
seats. In view of its larger size, the Tribunal is also more representative
of the various legal systems and the different regions of the world. If the
Tribunal does not include upon the bench a judge of the nationality of a
party to a dispute, that party may designate a person of its choice to sit as
a judge ad hoc.
The Tribunal is open to States Parties to the Convention, other
States, as well as other entities, such as international organizations and
natural or legal persons in any case expressly provided for in Part XI of
the Convention-regarding exploration and exploitation of the
International Seabed Area--or in any case submitted pursuant to any
other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is
accepted by all the parties to the case. It has been pointed out that the
fact that the European Community can be a party before the Tribunal
renders it the Community's preferred choice for settling disputes with
third countries relating to the law of the sea.
34
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is not as
32. ROTHWELL, supra note 30, at 34.
33. A.E. BOYLE, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the
Settlement of Disputes, in THE CHANGING WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A TRIBUTE TO THE LATE KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, 99, 118 (J.J.
Norton, M. Andenas & M. Footer eds., 1998).
34. Judge Riidiger Wolfrum, President, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement on the occasion of the Information Session organized by the Tribunal for the
Diplomatic Corps, 6 (Oct. 6, 2005) (citing Joe Borg, Commissioner, Fisheries and
Maritime Affairs of the European Union, Statement on the occasion of his visit to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, (Sept. 2, 2005)).
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broad ratione materiae as that of the International Court of Justice, as it
is confined to matters provided for in the Convention and related
instruments. However, it is certainly more comprehensive ratione
personae, as in cases before the Court only States may be parties.35
Access is probably the most significant difference between the Tribunal
and the International Court of Justice.36
Recourse to the Tribunal involves no costs for the States Parties to
the Convention. When a dispute involves an entity that is neither a State
Party nor the International Seabed Authority, the Tribunal fixes the
amount which that party must contribute towards the expenses of the
Tribunal.3 7 Other costs, notably the fees for legal representation, are
borne by the party incurring them, unless decided otherwise by the
Tribunal.38 The Secretary-General of the United Nations established a
trust fund to assist developing States settling their disputes through the
Tribunal, following a decision of the General Assembly.39
The principal provision of Part XV of the Convention is Article 287,
which outlines various procedures available to parties to settle their
disputes peacefully through the compulsory mechanisms established by
the Convention.4 0 Article 287 provides that a State party, when signing,
ratifying or acceding to the Convention or at any time thereupon, is free
to choose one or more of the four means for the settlement of disputes
aforementioned, by submission of a written declaration to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.4' So far only forty-one States have made
such a declaration-and a mere twenty-three of those have accepted the
42Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction. In the absence of such a
declaration, parties are deemed to have accepted arbitration, which, in
practice, has proven to be the general rule, while choosing the Tribunal
or the International Court of Justice has remained the exception despite
35. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p l=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
36. A.E. BOYLE, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, in 46 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY, 37, 51 (P. C. Rao & R. Khan eds., 1997); see also R. WOLFRUM, Verfahren
zur Freigabe von Schiffen vor dem Internationalen Seegerichtshof, in 70
SEEHANDELSRECHT UND SEERECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROLF HERBER ZUM, 569 (Hamburg,
LIT, 1999).
37. A Guide to Proceedings before the Tribunal, supra note 14, at 8 (citing
Convention, supra note 11, at Annex VI, art. 19).
38. See id. at art. 34.
39. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Trust Fund (2004), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/itlostrustfund.htm
40. ROTHWELL, supra note 30, at 32.
41. Convention, supra note 11, at pt. XV, art. 287.
42. See Oceans and Law of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/conventiondeclarations.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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the fact that these two judicial bodies are institutions representing the
international community.43 It may seem somewhat doubtful whether this
development was really anticipated at the time of the negotiations on the
Convention, or whether it was believed that arbitration, despite being the
default procedure, would turn out to be a rather subsidiary means for the
settlement of disputes.44
The Statute of the Tribunal contains a provision for the
establishment of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, as well as special
chambers for dealing with particular disputes or categories of disputes.45
The Seabed Disputes Chamber, which is a "tribunal within a tribunal,"
consists of eleven judges, each of whom are selected every three years.
The Conference on the Law of the Sea had originally envisioned the
establishment of a Seabed Tribunal as one of the principal organs of the
International Seabed Authority to deal exclusively with seabed disputes.
This approach was, however, abandoned in favour of establishing a fully-
fledged Tribunal as an autonomous international organ with a Seabed
Disputes Chamber.46 That Chamber has not yet heard a single case,
mainly because deep seabed mining is not yet commercially viable, and
may not be anytime soon. Its future potential, however, cannot be
denied. Experts from the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and
Natural Resources have estimated that there is more dormant nickel and
cobalt to be found in the manganese nodules on the bed of the Pacific
Ocean than in all terrestrial deposits currently being exploited.
According to these estimates, the metal content of the manganese
nodules is enough to meet the world's nickel, cobalt, copper and
manganese needs for the whole of the twenty-first century.4 7
The Seabed Disputes Chamber may also give advisory opinions at
the request of the Assembly or the Council of the International Seabed
Authority regarding legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities. In particular, the Chamber may be requested to give an
43. See Wolfrum, supra note 26.
44. See Judge Riidiger Wolfrum, President, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement at the Plenary of the 61' t Session of the United National General Assembly, 7
(Dec. 8, 2006).
45. Convention, supra note 11, at Annex VI, arts. 14-15.
46. A.O. ADEDE, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea-A Drafting History and a Commentary, in 10
PUBLICATIONS ON OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, 173-74 (Dordrecht; Boston; Lancaster:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987); see also A. K. ESCHER, Release of Vessels and Crews
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in 3 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: A PRACTITIONER'S JOURNAL, no. 2, 205, 237-38
(Eduardo Valencia-Ospina ed., 2004).
47. Brigitte Zypries, German Federal Minister of Justice, Speech at the Tenth
Anniversary of the Founding of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Sept.
18, 2006).
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opinion as to the conformity with the Convention of a proposal on any
matter before the Assembly.48 Thus far, these organs of the Authority
have not made use of this possibility.
Following a similar system of the International Court of Justice, the
Tribunal established several special chambers: the Chamber of Summary
Procedure, composed of five members and two alternates; the Chamber
for Fisheries Disputes and Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes,
each consisting of seven members of the Tribunal; and the Chamber for
Maritime Delimitation Disputes, which was set up in March 2007 and is
comprised of eight judges. A judgment given by any of the special
chambers is considered to have been rendered by the full Tribunal.49
More importantly in practice, however, seems to be the possibility
to form an ad hoc special chamber, such as that convened to settle the
dispute between Chile and the European Community regarding the
conservation of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean. An
ad hoc chamber consists of at least three members, who may be chosen
from among the members of the Tribunal. The Parties may also
designate ad hoc judges.50 That system should be of particular interest to
parties considering arbitration, since, as in arbitration, parties are given
substantial freedom to choose the judges who are to sit in such a
chamber, and may even propose modifications to the Tribunal's rules of
procedure for the chamber to apply. Thus, the parties can enjoy all the
benefits of arbitration, without being required to bear the expenses of the
chamber.5'
So far, the system of special chambers-apart from ad hoc
chambers-has not proven particularly successful. Until now, all the
cases dealt with by the Tribunal have, with the aforementioned
exception, been submitted to the full Tribunal. This reflects the reality
that chambers do not deliver their orders or judgments any more quickly
than does the full Tribunal, nor are the costs for the parties significantly
lower. Parties to a dispute might even consider that the judgment of a
full Tribunal stands on a higher footing than the judgment of a
Chamber-although the legally binding nature of the decision rendered
is exactly the same in both cases. 52 Likewise, recourse has been made to
the system of chambers offered by the International Court of Justice in
48. Statement at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, supra note 26, at 8.
49. Convention, supra note 11, at Annex VI, art. 15.
50. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Rules of the Tribunal, arts. 19-22
(Oct. 28, 1997), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.htnl (last visited Feb. 23,
2008).
51. See RAO, supra note 15, at 194.
52. See id. at 195.
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only a modest number of cases.
The Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction in relation to disputes
regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention in general is
cofitingent upon declarations by States Parties pursuant to Article 287.
The Convention, however, does confer compulsory jurisdiction upon the
Tribunal in relation to two specific substantive matters already referred
to-provisional measures and the prompt release of vessels and crews-
independently of the choice of procedure mechanism. These particular
instances of compulsory jurisdiction have been entrusted to the Tribunal
because they concern functions which cannot be performed properly by
an arbitral tribunal.53  The drafters of the Convention therefore
considered that such matters should be resolved before a permanently
established body. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that only
permanent tribunals are institutions that allow the development of a
corpus of jurisprudence as they have the capacity and the obligation to
create a body of decisional law that will serve the long-term interests of
all States.
54
III. Jurisprudence of the Tribunal
A. Cases Relating to Provisional Measures
The Tribunal may be requested to prescribe provisional measures in
two situations, first where a dispute on the merits has been submitted to
the Tribunal, and second when a dispute on the merits has been
submitted to an arbitral tribunal, pending its constitution.5
When a party to a dispute that has been submitted to an arbitral
tribunal requests provisional measures, the Tribunal is empowered,
pursuant to Article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention, to grant such
measures pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, unless the
parties have agreed to seize another court or tribunal within two weeks of
the date of the request for provisional measures. Thus, the Tribunal may,
at the request of a State Party, prescribe provisional measures against
another State Party pending the final decision to be given not by the
Tribunal itself, but by an arbitral tribunal that is yet to be constituted. In
order to prescribe provisional measures, the Tribunal must consider that
the measures are required by the urgency of the situation and that, prima
53. T. Treves, The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
37 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400 (1997).
54. See WOLFRUM, supra note 3, at 6.
55. See id. at 5 (noting that under the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995 the
Tribunal is empowered to prescribe provisional measures to protect the rights of the
parties as well as to prevent damage to the fish stocks in question).
[Vol. 26:2
2007] THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 299
facie, the arbitral tribunal to be constituted would have jurisdiction. As
regards disputes in relation to activities in the International Seabed Area,
an arbitral tribunal dealing with a commercial dispute shall, according to
Article 188, paragraph 2, refer any question of the interpretation of Part
XI of the Convention and the annexes relating thereto to the Seabed
Disputes Chamber for a ruling, either at the request of any party to the
dispute, orproprio motu.
It is interesting to note in this regard important innovations
introduced by the Convention. First, the measures prescribed by the
Tribunal are binding upon the parties to the dispute. Second, the
Tribunal may prescribe provisional measures not only to preserve the
respective rights of the parties to the dispute, but also to "prevent serious
harm to the marine environment." In addition, the Tribunal may follow
up the measures it has prescribed by requesting the parties to submit
reports on compliance.56 In order to strengthen the pressure of public
opinion on the parties with respect to provisional measures, the Tribunal
also has the possibility to send the notices relating to the prescription,
modification, or revocation of provisional measures," not only to the
parties to the dispute, but also to such other States Parties to the
Convention it considers appropriate. The Tribunal has made use of this
possibility only once so far. 8
The Tribunal's power to prescribe provisional measures has already
been invoked in four cases dealing with the protection of the marine
environment: the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the MOX Plant Case,
and the Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around
the Straits of Johor5 9
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,60 the applicants, Australia and
56. Statement by President Wolfrum to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, October 24, 2005, 5, available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
57. To date there are no cases where provisional measures prescribed by the
Tribunal have been modified or revoked by the Tribunal or Annex VII tribunals.
58. Only the Order of August 27, 1999 in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases made
reference to the relevant Article 290, 4 of the Convention and Article 94 of the Rules of
the Tribunal. The Tribunal decided that the provisional measures prescribed in this Order
shall forthwith be notified by the Registrar through appropriate means to all States Parties
to the Convention participating in the fishery for Southern Bluefin Tuna.
59. There are no other cases which have been submitted to other courts or tribunals
requesting provisional measures under Article 290 of the Convention.
60. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan)
(Provisional Measures), Order of August 27, 1999, 3 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of
Judgment Advisory Opinions and Orders 280-336 (1999), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2-en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "List of cases"
hyperlink to "Cases No. 3 and 4" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); Press Releases
No. 27, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases Hearings Conclude, (Aug.
26, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink
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New Zealand, sought relief from the Tribunal in relation to Japan's
unilateral decision to conduct an experimental fishing program, which
was planned for a duration of three years. The two applicant countries
argued that while the fish stock was at its lowest historical level, Japan's
experimental fishing programme would effectively increase its catch by
thirty percent; the total allowable catch of this species had been agreed
by the three countries under the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna.61  Australia and New Zealand requested the
Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures to the effect that Japan
immediately cease its unilateral experimental fishing of southern bluefin
tuna, restrict its catch to the national quotum as last agreed, and require
all parties to act consistently with the precautionary principle-caution
and vigilance-in fishing for southern bluefin tuna pending final
settlement of the dispute. Japan contended that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction, and that even if it did, the prescription of provisional
measures would not be appropriate, since there was no risk of irreparable
damage to the fish stock in question.
In its Order of August 27, 1999, the Tribunal noted that there was
no disagreement between the parties that the stock of southern bluefin
tuna was severely depleted. It further considered that the conservation of
the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. An important finding in the
Tribunal's Order was that the parties should, under the circumstances, act
with "prudence and caution" to ensure that effective conservation
measures were taken to prevent serious harm to stock of southern bluefin
tuna. The Tribunal also ordered, inter alia, that the parties should
resume negotiations without delay, with a view to reaching agreement on
measures for the conservation and management of these fish stocks, and
that the parties should restrict their catches.
What may be considered quite striking was the fact that the Tribunal
decided that all of the parties had to adhere to the annual national
allocation that had last been agreed upon unless the parties were able to
agree otherwise. The prescription of fish catch totals is normally an
exercise of authority taking place on a national basis, or cooperatively
between the relevant States.62 Although there is no express reference in
to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); Press Release No. 28, Int'l
Trib. L. of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Tribunal Prescribes Provisional
Measures (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site
Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
61. Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 1994 Austl. T.S. No.
16, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1994/l6.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
62. N. KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, 81 (Cambridge University Press) (2005).
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the Order to the precautionary principle itself, the Tribunal nevertheless
prescribed de facto precautionary measures and seems at least implicitly
to have relied on that principle.63
It has been observed that the Tribunal's intervention at the stage of
provisional measures played a very significant role in bringing the
parties-Australia, New Zealand and Japan-back to negotiations with
each other, with the eventual result that the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Commission was revitalized and is now functioning well.
64
In the MOX Plant Case,65 the Tribunal heard a dispute between
Ireland and the United Kingdom regarding the potentially harmful
impact on the marine environment of the operation of a MOX plant
situated at Sellafield, United Kingdom, on the coast of the Irish Sea.
Such a plant recycles material from nuclear reactors and converts it into a
new fuel called MOX-mixed oxide fuel-intended for use as an energy
source in nuclear power stations. The Irish Government had pointed out
that the operation of the plant would contribute to the pollution of the
Irish Sea, and emphasized the risks involved in the transportation of
radioactive material to and from the plant. Ireland requested that the
dispute be submitted to an arbitral tribunal to be established under Annex
VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
furthermore, submitted a request for the prescription of provisional
measures under Article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention to the
Tribunal, pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Ireland
requested inter alia that the United Kingdom immediately suspend its
authorization of the MOX plant, or alternatively take such measures as
were necessary to prevent, with immediate effect, the operation of the
MOX plant and furthermore ensure there are no movements of any
radioactive substances or materials into or out of waters over which it has
sovereignty. The United Kingdom requested that the Tribunal reject
Ireland's request for provisional measures.
In its Order of December 3, 2001, the Tribunal found that the
63. G. Rashbrooke, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Forum for
the Development of Principles of International Environmental Law, 19 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. No. 4, 523 (2004); see also Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory
Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICTORIA U.WELLINGTON
L. REV. 698 (2005).
64. See Rashbrooke, supra note 63, at 532; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, supra note
63.
65. The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures),
Order of December 3, 2001, in International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Reports of
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 2001, volume 5, 89-112; see also Press
Release, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order to be delivered in the
MOX Plant Case on Monday, December 3, 2001, at 11 a.m. (Nov. 29, 2001) (on file with
author); see also Press Release, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order
in The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Dec. 3, 2001) (on file with author).
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urgency of the situation did not, in the short period before the
constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, require the prescription of
provisional measures as requested by Ireland. However, the Tribunal did
consider that the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the
Convention, as well as under general international law, and that rights
arise therefrom, which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to conserve
under Article 290 of the Convention. The Tribunal therefore ordered the
litigants-pending a decision by the arbitral tribunal-to cooperate and
enter into consultations in order to exchange further information
regarding the possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising from the
commissioning of the MOX plant, and to devise, as appropriate,
measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment which might
result from the plant's operation.
The Order itself contains no reference to the precautionary
principle, except to note that Ireland had argued its application in the
case. 66 The reason, therefore, may have been that in the opinion of the
Tribunal, provisional measures should not anticipate a judgment on the
merits.
In its judgment of May 30, 2006, in the case, Commission of the
European Communities versus Ireland,67 the Court of Justice of the
European Communities stated that it had exclusive jurisdiction to rule on
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of provisions of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which form part of the
Community legal order. As the provisions of the Convention relied on
by Ireland in the context of the dispute with the United Kingdom
regarding the MOX plant formed part of the Community legal order, the
Court found accordingly that it had jurisdiction to deal with disputes
relating to the interpretation or application of these provisions, and to
determine whether a Member State had complied with them. The
declaration of Community competence, so far as concerned, in particular,
the provisions of the Convention with respect to the prevention of marine
pollution, made the transfer to the Community of areas of shared
competence subject to the existence of Community rules.
The Court held that by bringing proceedings under the dispute
settlement procedure laid down in the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Ireland had failed to comply with its duty of cooperation under the
European Community and Euratom Treaties, and accordingly was in
66. See Rashbrooke, supra note 63, at 527.
67. Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, ECJ Judgment of May 30,
2006, C-459/3; see also N. Lavranos, The MOX Plant Judgment of the ECJ: How
Exclusive is the Jurisdiction of the ECJ?, 15 EUR. ENVTL. L. REv. 291-96 (2006).
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breach of Community Law. This judgment met with criticism in
Ireland,6s and clearly cannot please the Tribunal. For, the position taken
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities may seriously
affect the future possibility of Member States of the European Union to
make use of the dispute settlement mechanism of the Convention on the
Law of the Sea in cases of disputes among them.
The Case of Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the
Straits of Johor69 concerned a dispute between Malaysia and Singapore
relating to land reclamation activities carried out by Singapore which,
according to Malaysia, impinged upon its rights in and around the Straits
of Johor-the body of water separating Malaysia from the island of
Singapore. Malaysia claimed that Singapore's actions were in breach of
its duties under international law, including, inter alia, its duties to
preserve and protect the marine environment. The application of the
precautionary principle was also argued. Malaysia requested the
Tribunal to order Singapore to suspend all land reclamation activities in
the vicinity of the maritime boundary between the two States, to provide
Malaysia with full information as to the current and projected works, and
to agree to negotiate with Malaysia concerning any remaining unresolved
issues. Singapore requested the Tribunal to dismiss Malaysia's request
for provisional measures.
In its Order of October 8, 2003, the Tribunal considered that in the
particular circumstances of this case, the land reclamation works may
have adverse effects on the marine environment in and around the Straits
of Johor. The Tribunal prescribed provisional measures, pending a
decision by an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, requiring Malaysia and
Singapore to cooperate and enter into consultation to establish promptly
a group of independent experts to study the effects of Singapore's land
reclamation. Singapore was, furthermore, directed not to conduct its
land reclamation in ways that might cause irreparable prejudice to the
rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the marine environment, taking
especially into account the report of the group of independent experts.
The Order also stated that "prudence and caution" require Malaysia and
68. See Dick Roche, Statement by the Irish Minister for the Environment, the IRISH
TIMES, May 31, 2006, at 14; see also CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 397.
69. See Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits
of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures), Order of October 8, 2003, in
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions
and Orders 2003, volume 7, p. 10-64; see also Press Release, International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, Order to be Delivered in Case No. 12 on Wednesday, 8 October 2003
at 3 p.m. (October 6, 2003) (on file with author); see also Press Release, International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order in the Case concerning Land Reclamation by
Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (October 8, 2003)
(on file with author).
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Singapore to establish mechanisms for exchanging information,
assessing risks of the reclamation projects, and devising mechanisms to
deal with it, without, however, making reference to the precautionary
principle as such.
It should further be mentioned that on April 26, 2005, Malaysia and
Singapore settled their dispute by signing an agreement to this effect. On
September 1, 2005, a final arbitral award was made in the case in
accordance with the terms specified in the settlement agreement. The
provisional measures ordered by the Tribunal in 2003 were obviously
instrumental in bringing the parties together and providing a successful
diplomatic solution to the dispute.7°
The record of the Tribunal on environmental disputes is thus a
positive one, despite the absence of any opportunity to decide such a case
on the merits. 71 The aforementioned cases have enabled the Tribunal to
contribute to the development of international environmental law, in
particular by emphasizing the duty of cooperation,72 the notion of
prudence and caution, and the importance of procedural rights, as
essential components of environmental obligations. In its orders for
provisional measures, the Tribunal followed the line of adopting a
pragmatic approach and prescribing measures which, in its view, would
assist the parties to find a solution.73 It should also be noted that these
cooperation orders were made notwithstanding findings that the evidence
failed to show that irreparable harm was either imminent or likely. 4
B. Cases Relating to Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews75
As already mentioned, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Tribunal
encompasses cases in which it is alleged that by detaining a vessel flying
the flag of another State and/or its crew for certain offences-for
instance in respect of illegal fishing or pollution-a State has violated the
provisions of the Convention for the prompt release of the vessel and its
crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security. It
is important to point out that the Convention permits coastal States to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction through the seizure of vessels and
70. See President Wolfrum on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary Ceremony at
the Vertretung der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, Berlin, September 18, 2006.
71. See Alan Boyle, The Environmental Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, 22 THE INT'L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 369 (2007).
72. See P. Weckel, "Les premieres applications de l'article 290 de la Convention sur
le droit de la mer relatif a la prescription de mesures conservatoires," Revue Gnrale de
Droit International Public, 2005, Tome CVIX, 838.
73. See Wolfrum, supra note 20, at 76.
74. See Boyle, supra note 71, at 11.
75. See generally Escher, supra note 46.
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crews in certain limited circumstances.76 Since its adoption, coastal
States have with increasing urgency addressed the problem of illegal,
unregulated and unreported fishing in their maritime zones. Coastal
States are entitled to board and inspect any vessel within their two
hundred nautical mile exclusive economic zones-where around ninety
percent of commercial fishing takes place 77-in order to enforce their
laws and regulations in respect of the living resources of that area.78
Whenever it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied
with its duty under the Convention of prompt release of vessels and
crew, the flag State of the vessel is entitled under Article 292-a
provision which constitutes a counterpart to the rights granted to coastal
States-to request the release of the vessel before the Tribunal. The
question of release may be submitted not only by the flag State, but also
"on its behalf., 79 This permits States either once and for all, or on a case-
by-case basis, to entrust the interested ship owners, or for instance,
associations of such ship owners with the power to act on their behalf. In
this way, in practice even though not in principle, private parties may be
allowed to further their interests directly before the Tribunal.80
It is important to note that in prompt release proceedings, the
Tribunal may deal only with the question of the release of the vessel
without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate
domestic forum in respect of the vessel, its owner or its crew. 8' In its
jurisprudence, the Tribunal has strictly applied this requirement of the
Convention.
82
The prompt release procedure before the Tribunal is also
characterised by its swiftness. The Tribunal, according to its Rules, shall
give priority to applications for the release of vessels or crews over all
other proceedings.83  The hearing must take place within a period of
fifteen days commencing with the first working day following the date
76. See Convention, supra note 11, at art. 73, 220.
77. R. Churchill, "The Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea Relating to Fisheries: Is There Much In The Net?," Summary of Presentation,
Symposium of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea: Assessments and Prospects,
29-30, September, 2006, ITLOS, Hamburg, 1.
78. See KLEIN, supra note 62, at 86.
79. See Wolfrum, supra note 34, at 577-78.
80. See Treves, supra note 53, at 401-02 (stating that normal practice has been for
the application to be submitted on behalf of the flag State; however, in the Volga Case the
submission was made directly by the flag State, as the agent of the Russian Federation
was a member of the Foreign Ministry); see also P. Gautier, "Les affaires de 'prompte
mainleve' devant le Tribunal international du droit de la mer", The Global Community
Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2003, volume 3(d), p. 8532.
81. See Convention, supra note 11, at art. 292, 3.
82. See Wolfrum, supra note 3, at 3.
83. See RULES OF THE TRIBUNAL, supra note 50, at art. 112.
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on which the application is received, and the judgment must not be read
later than fourteen days after the closure of the hearing.84 In its practice,
the Tribunal has acted in prompt release proceedings with remarkable
efficiency and speed, having delivered its decisions, in accordance with
its Rules, within the time frame of approximately one month. The
urgency of these proceedings is justified in view of the financial burden
resulting from the detention of a vessel, as well as humanitarian
considerations regarding detained crews.85 The Tribunal has so far been
seized of applications for prompt release in nine cases, nearly all of them
connected with fisheries.
The first such case concerned an application by Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines for the prompt release of the oil tanker M/V Saiga and its
crew from detention in Conakry, Guinea,86 the applicant State, inter alia,
accusing Guinea of piracy. Guinea had claimed that the Saiga was
engaged in smuggling activities off its coast when arrested. The arrest at
a point outside Guinean waters was claimed to be in the exercise of the
right of hot pursuit. Guinea also maintained that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in the matter and that the claim by Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines was inadmissible. After a procedure of only three weeks, the
Tribunal on December 4, 1997 delivered its judgment and ordered the
prompt release of the vessel and its crew from detention upon the deposit
of a bond of 400,000 US Dollars taking into consideration the value of
the cargo, which was already with the Guinean authorities.87 In that case,
the Tribunal also held that a State may make an application under Article
292 of the Convention, not only where no bond has been set, but also
where it considers that the bond set by the detaining State is
unreasonable.
The next case regarding prompt release concerned the fishing vessel
84. V.P. Bantz, Views from Hamburg: The Juno Trader Case or How to Make Sense
of the Coastal State's Rights in the Light of its Duty of Prompt Release, 24 U.
QUEENSLAND L.J., no. 2,418 (2005).
85. See Wolfrum supra note 3, at 4; see also Wolfrum, supra note 20, at 74.
86. MV "Saiga" Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Prompt
Release), Judgment of December 4, 1997, 1 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments
Advisory Opinons and Orders, 16-38 (1997), available at http://www.itlos.org/
start2_en.html (follow the "Site Index" hyperlink to the "List of Cases" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Press Release No. 9, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Hearings in
the M/V Saiga Case, (Nov. 21, 1997), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
87. Press Release No. 10, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Hearings Concluded in the M/V
Saiga case, (Dec. 14, 1997); see also Press Release No. 13, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea,
Tribunal Seized of Merits of Case of "Bunkering" of Vessels at Sea (Feb. 28, 1998); see
also Press Release No. 14, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Guinea Complies with Judgment of
the Tribunal (Mar. 16, 1998), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow
"Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases") (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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Camouco,88 flying the Panamanian flag and arrested by France for
alleged unlawful fishing in the exclusive economic zone of the Crozet
Islands-French Southern and Antarctic Territories. The Tribunal was
requested on behalf of Panama to order the prompt release of the
Camouco and its Master, whereas France requested the Tribunal to reject
the submissions of Panama and declare the application inadmissible. In
case the Tribunal would decide that the Camouco were to be released
upon the deposit of a bond, France requested that the bond be no less
than twenty million French Francs. In its judgment of February 7, 2000,
the Tribunal ordered the prompt release of the vessel on the deposit of a
financial security of eight million French Francs, approximately
1.2 million US Dollars. The Tribunal observed in this case that Article
292 of the Convention provides for a quick, independent remedy during
which local remedies-as France had argued-could normally not be
exhausted.
A case involving the Seychelles and France concerned the vessel
Monte Confurco,89 registered in the Republic of the Seychelles, and
licensed by it to fish in international waters. The vessel was
apprehended by France for alleged illegal fishing and failure to announce
its presence in the exclusive economic zone of the Kerguelen Islands.
The Tribunal was requested on behalf of Seychelles to order the prompt
release of the Monte Confurco and its master. France requested the
Tribunal to declare that the bond set by the competent French
authorities-56.4 million French Francs-was reasonable and that the
application was inadmissible. The Tribunal in its judgment of December
18, 2000 ordered the prompt release of the vessel and its master by
France upon the furnishing of a security of eighteen million French
Francs by the Seychelles, as the bond set by the national French court
was not considered reasonable.
88. The "Camouco" Case (Panama v. France) (Prompt Release), Judgment of
February 7, 2000, 4 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments Advisory Opinons and
Orders, 10-37 (2000); see also Press Release No. 35, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, vessel and
Master to be Released on Deposit of FF 8 Million (Feb. 7, 2000), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to"Press Releases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
89. The "Monte Confurco" Case (Seychelles v. France) (Prompt Release), Judgment
of December 18, 2000, 4 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments Advisory Opinons
and Orders, 86-117 (2000), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site
Index" hyperlink to "List of Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2006); see also Press
Release No. 41, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Judgment to be Delivered on the "Monti
Confurco" Case (Dec. 15, 2000); see also Press Release No. 42, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea,
tribunal delivers Judgment on the "Monti Confurco" Case (Dec. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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The fishing trawler Grand Prince,90 at that time flying the flag of
Belize, was arrested by the French authorities in the exclusive economic
zone of the Kerguelen Islands for alleged illegal fishing. The competent
French court confirmed the seizure of the vessel, and fixed a bond for its
release in the amount of eleven million French Francs, which was later
followed by a confiscation order. On April 20, 2001, the Tribunal
delivered its judgment in that case and found that it had no jurisdiction
under Article 292 of the Convention to entertain the application as the
documentary evidence submitted by the applicant failed to establish that
Belize was the flag State of the vessel when the application was made.
This decision underlines the importance the Tribunal attaches to the
matter of registration of ships.
The proceedings in the Chaisiri Reefer 2 Case9 1 were instituted by
Panama against Yemen for the prompt release of that vessel, its crew and
cargo, which had been detained by the authorities of Yemen. Following
an agreement between Panama and Yemen on July 13, 2001-after the
release of the vessel and its cargo and crew-the case was removed from
the Tribunal's list of cases. In this case, the availability of the relief
provided by the Tribunal helped in reaching an out-of-court settlement.
The Russian vessel Volga92 was arrested in 2000 by Australia for
alleged illegal fishing in the Australian fishing zone. The Russian
Federation submitted an application to the Tribunal requesting the
90. The "Grand Prince" Case (Belize v. France) (Prompt Release), Judgment of
April 20, 2001, 5 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments Advisory Opinions and
Orders, 17-46 (2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site
Index" hyperlink to "List of Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Press
Release No. 47, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Judgment to be delivered on the "Grand Prince"
Case (Apr. 19, 2001); Press Release No. 48, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Tribunal Delivers
Judgment on the "Grand Prince" Case (Apr. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
91. The "Chaisiri Reefer 2" Case (Panama v. Yemen) (Prompt Release), Order of
July 13, 2001, 5 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments Advisory Opinons and Orders
82-84 (2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index"
hyperlink to "List of Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Press
Releases No. 51, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Application Filed on Behalf of Panama Against
Yemen, (July, 5, 2001); Press Release No. 52, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, "Chaisiri Reefer
2" Case Removed from Tribunal's List (July 16, 2001), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
92. The "Volga" Case (Russia v. Australia) (Prompt Release), Judgment of
December 23, 2002, 6 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of Judgments Advisory Opinons and
Orders 10-41 (2002), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site
Index" hyperlink to "List of Cases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Press
Releases No. 74, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Judgment to be Delivered in the "Volga" Case
(Dec. 20, 2002); Press Release No. 75, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Judgment Delivered in
the "Volga" case (Dec. 23, 2002), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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release of the Volga and its crew, the conditions for release imposed by
Australia being neither permissible nor reasonable under the Convention.
Australia requested that the Tribunal reject the application, maintaining
that the bond sought was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In
its judgment of December 23, 2002, the Tribunal took note of the
concern of Australia with regard to the depletion of stocks of Patagonian
Toothfish in the Southern Ocean and also stated that the amount of
1,920,000 Australian Dollars sought for the release of the vessel was
reasonable in terms of Article 292 of the Convention. The Tribunal,
however, considered that the non-financial conditions laid down by
Australia could not be considered as components of the bond or other
financial security for the purposes of that provision of the Convention.
The Juno Trader Case93 was submitted to the Tribunal on behalf of
the flag State of the vessel, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, against
Guinea-Bissau. The dispute concerned the detention of that vessel and
its crew by Guinea-Bissau for the alleged infringement of national
fisheries legislation in its exclusive economic zone. Guinea-Bissau
objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the grounds that, according
to its national legislation, the ownership of the vessel Juno Trader had
reverted to the State of Guinea-Bissau and that, therefore, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines no longer could be considered the flag State of the
vessel. The Tribunal, however, considered that, whatever may be the
effect of a definitive change in the ownership of a vessel upon its
nationality, there was no basis in the particular circumstances of the case
for holding that there had been such a definitive change. In its judgment
of December 18, 2004, the Tribunal thus ordered the prompt release of
the vessel Juno Trader, upon the posting of a bond of 300,000 Euros. It
also declared that all members of the crew should be free to leave
Guinea-Bissau without any conditions.
The Hoshinmaru Case,94 which focused on the question of the
93. The "Juno Trader" Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau)
(Prompt Release), Judgment of December 18, 2004, 8 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. of
Judgments Advisory Opinons and Orders 17-92 (2004), available at
http://www.itIos.org/start2_- en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "List of Cases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also Press Release No. 92, Int'l Trib. L. of the
Sea, hearing in the "Juno Trader" Case Postponed (Dec. 1, 2004); Press Release No. 95,
Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Judgment Delivered in the "Juno Trader" Case (Dec. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press
Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
94. Press Releases No. 110, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Two applications filed at the
Tribunal on behalf of Japan against the Russian Federation for release of two arrested
fishing vessels (July 6, 2007); see also Press Release No. 11, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea,
Tribunal to deliver its Judgments in The "Hoshinmaru " Case and The "Tomimaru " Case
(Aug.2, 2007); see also Press Release No. 112, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Tribunal Delivers
Judgment on Case No. 14 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.itlos.org/
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reasonableness of the bond, concerned a dispute submitted by Japan on
July 6, 2007 regarding the detention of that fishing vessel by the
authorities of the Russian Federation for the alleged infringement of
national fisheries legislation in its exclusive economic zone. On July
13-more than five weeks after the detention of the vessel-Russia set a
bond of twenty-five million Roubles (approximately 980,000 US
Dollars) and claimed that the application was therefore inadmissible.
Japan maintained that the amount of the bond was unreasonable and did
not meet the requirements of Article 292 of the Convention. Both parties
further disagreed as to whether the crew and the Master were being
detained along with the vessel. In its judgment of August 6, 2007, the
Tribunal confirmed its previous jurisprudence regarding the
reasonableness of a bond or other financial security and, inter alia, stated
that it did not consider it reasonable for a bond to be set on the basis of
the maximum penalties applicable to the owner and the Master, nor that a
bond be set on the basis of the confiscation of the vessel given the
circumstances of the case. The amount of the bond should be
proportionate to the gravity of the alleged offences. The Tribunal thus
considered the amount of the bond fixed by the Russian Federation not to
be reasonable and decided that the Hoshinmaru, including its catch on
board, should be promptly released upon the posting of a bond or other
security as determined by the Tribunal and that the Master and the crew
should be free to leave without any conditions. It further determined that
the bond should amount to ten million Roubles (approximately 390,000
US Dollars). On August 16, 2007 the bond was received by the Russian
Federation and the vessel and crew were released on the same day.95
The Tomimaru Case96 was submitted by Japan on the same day as
the Hoshinmaru Case and also concerned the detention of that fishing
vessel by the authorities of the Russian Federation for the alleged
infringement of national fisheries legislation in its exclusive economic
start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008); see also the website of the Tribunal at www.itlos.org (last visited Feb. 23,
2008).
95. Press Release No. 114, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, The "Hoshinmaru" Case
Release Of the Vessel and Crew After Posting of the Bond Ordered by the Tribunal (Aug.
17, 2007), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink
to "Press Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
96. Two applications filed at the Tribunal on behalf of Japan against the Russian
Federation for release of two arrested fishing vessels (July 6, 2007), Press Release No.
11, Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea, Tribunal to deliver its Judgments in The "Hoshinmaru "
Case and The "Tomimaru" Case (Aug.2, 2007); Press Release No. 113, Int'l Trib. L. of
the Sea, Tribunal Delivers Judgment in Case No. 15 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "Site Index" hyperlink to "Press Releases"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see also the website of the Tribunal at
www.itlos.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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zone. In that case, the Tribunal had to deal with the thorny issue of the
effects of the confiscation of a fishing vessel-a measure that many
States have in their legislation with respect to the conservation and
management of natural resources. The Tomimaru had already been
detained on October 31, 2006 and the crew had been allowed to leave the
Russian Federation long before the application was submitted by Japan.
The competent Russian Courts had decided to confiscate the vessel and
Russia thus maintained that the application by Japan had been rendered
without object. In its judgment of August 6, 2007 the Tribunal expressed
the view that the decision to confiscate eliminates the provisional
character of the detention of the vessel rendering the procedure for its
prompt release without object. It, however, also observed that such a
decision should not be taken in such a way as to prevent the ship owner
from having recourse to available domestic judicial remedies, or as to
prevent the flag State from resorting to the prompt release procedure set
forth in the Convention. The Tribunal further underscored that a
decision to confiscate the vessel did not prevent it from considering an
application for prompt release while proceedings are still before the
domestic courts of the detaining State. Note was taken of the fact that
the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which
confirmed the decision of the lower courts to confiscate the Tomimaru,
had brought to an end the procedures before the domestic courts. The
Tribunal thus found that the application of Japan no longer had any
object and that it was therefore not called upon to give a decision
thereon.
In respect of the six cases in which the Tribunal ordered the release
of the vessel and/or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond, it can
fairly be said that it has developed a coherent jurisprudence, particularly
as regards the relevant factors for determining the reasonableness of
bonds or other financial security. These factors, which by no means
constitute a complete list, include the gravity of the alleged offences, the
penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the
value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the
bond imposed by the detaining State and its form. The assessment of the
relevant factors by the Tribunal is an objective one, taking into account
all information provided by the parties and having regard to all the
circumstances of the particular case.97
The procedure for the prompt release of vessels and crews, with the
97. See ITLOS Reports 2000, p.10, at p.3I, 67, ITLOS Reports 2002, p.10, at p.32,
65, and ITLOS Reports 2004, p.17, at p.41, 85; see also T.A. Mensah, "Provisional
Measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," Zeitschrift fitir
auslandisches 6ffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht, 62, 2002, 1-2, 46.
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possibility for private parties, if properly authorized by the flag State, to
appear before the Tribunal, is certainly a significant innovation provided
by the Convention, if not the most important novel feature of its entire
dispute settlement mechanism. 98  This procedure constitutes an
appropriate and cost-effective mechanism for parties faced with the
arrest of vessels and crews. It seems, however, that the possibility to
institute such proceedings is not yet known well enough neither by ship
owners nor by flag States. It has not without some reason been said that
the existence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one
of the better-guarded secrets of the United Nations system. Flag States
may also sometimes hesitate to have recourse to the Tribunal. It has
therefore been suggested that owners who register their ships with flag
States should, in the negotiations prior to registration, obtain the right to
act on behalf of the flag State in the event of a dispute with a coastal
State regarding prompt release of vessels and crew.
C. Cases Relating to the Merits
The parties may also submit a particular dispute to the Tribunal at
any time by means of a special agreement, which, to date, has been done
on two occasions. In the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case,99 Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines and Guinea agreed to submit to the Tribunal the merits of
the dispute relating to the arrest and detention of the vessel M/V Saiga,
the only case which the Tribunal has so far decided on the merits. The
other case, 100 also relating to the merits and still on the docket, is based
on a special agreement and concerns the Conservation and Sustainable
Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean, a
dispute-as already mentioned-between Chile and the European
Community.
In the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case, the Tribunal had to deal with both
the merits and the request for the prescription of provisional measures.
The vessel and its crew continued to be held by Guinea even after the
Tribunal had prescribed their prompt release. Guinea had not only
arrested the tanker M/V Saiga, but also its master for providing fishing
vessels with gasoil-bunkering--off the coast of Guinea, which it
98. See Bantz, supra note 84, at 436-37.
99. MV "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)
(Merits), Judgment of July 1, 1999, in International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 1999, volume 3, 10-78; see also
Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Summary of opinions
appended to the Judgment of July 1, 1999 (July 1, 1999) (on file with author).
100. Case concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community), Order of 29
December 2005, ITLOS Reports 2005-2007, at 4 (still with publisher).
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alleged was an offence under its customs laws. Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines claimed, however, that the bunkering of the vessels is within
the freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone. The arrest of
the Saiga took place at a point outside Guinea's exclusive economic
zone, with Guinea claiming that the arrest followed its right of "hot
pursuit." Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in particular requested the
Tribunal to prescribe that Guinea should not interfere with the exercise
of the freedom of navigation and related rights, release the Saiga and its
crew, desist from enforcing its customs laws within the exclusive
economic zone, and refrain from undertaking hot pursuit of vessels
otherwise than authorized under the Convention. Guinea asked the
Tribunal to reject that request.
On March 11, 1998, the Tribunal delivered its Order regarding the
prescription of provisional measures 01 in response to the request by
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Tribunal ordered that Guinea
should refrain from taking or enforcing any judicial or administrative
measures against the Saiga, its master and the other members of the
crew, its owners or operators, in connection with the incidents leading to
the arrest and detention of the vessel and to the subsequent prosecution
and conviction of the master. The vessel, its captain and its crew had in
fact already been released shortly before in compliance by Guinea with
the judgment of the Tribunal of December 4, 1997.
The Tribunal delivered its judgment on the merits of that case on
July 1, 1999, within fifteen months of the proceedings being instituted.
Compared with other judicial bodies, this can certainly be considered a
reasonable period of time.10 2 The Tribunal declared that Guinea had
violated the rights of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in arresting the
Saiga, and awarded Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2,123,357 US
Dollars, with interest, as compensation. In that judgment, the Tribunal
made several important pronouncements concerning issues such as
freedom of navigation, enforcement of customs laws, nationality of
claims, reparation, use of force in law enforcement activities, hot pursuit
and the question of the genuine link between the vessel and its flag
State,10 3 thereby making an important contribution to the development of
international law regarding these aspects.
101. MV Saiga (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)
(Provisional Measures), Order of March 11, 1998, in International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 1998, volume 2, 24-40;
see also Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 21 Judges decide
unanimously on Order for provisional measures (March 11, 1998) (on file with author).
102. See Wolfrum, supra note 56, at 8.
103. See Statement by President Wolfrum at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties,
supra note 26, at 6.
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The following points made by the Tribunal in that case are to be
highlighted:
In considering whether the arrest was lawful, the Tribunal found
that by applying its customs laws to a customs radius, which includes
parts of the exclusive economic zone, Guinea acted in a manner contrary
to the Convention and that, consequently, the arrest and detention of the
Saiga, the prosecution and conviction of its master, the confiscation of
the cargo and the seizure of the ship were unlawful. With respect to the
right of hot pursuit claimed by Guinea, the Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the alleged pursuit was interrupted and that no laws or
regulations of Guinea applicable in accordance with the Convention were
violated by the Saiga, and that thus there was no legal basis for the
exercise of the right of hot pursuit. The Tribunal furthermore found that
Guinea's officials used excessive force and endangered human life
before and after boarding the Saiga.
In addition, the Tribunal, in dealing with the contention by Guinea
that the ship was unregistered for a certain period of time under Article
91 of the Convention, observed that it was for Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
for the registration of ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag.
As regards the question also raised by Guinea of the genuine link
between the Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Tribunal
concluded that the purpose of the provision of the Convention requiring a
genuine link between a ship and its flag is to secure more effective
implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria
by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag
State may be challenged by other States.
In examining the question whether certain claims could be
entertained because they related to violations of the rights of persons
who were not nationals of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the
Tribunal declared that the relevant provisions of the Convention consider
the ship as a unit, as regards the obligations of the flag State with respect
to the ship and the right of a flag State to seek reparation for loss or
damage caused to the ship by acts of other States and to institute
proceedings under Article 292 of the Convention. Thus, the ship,
everything on it and every person involved or interested in its operations
are treated as an entity linked to the flag State. The nationalities of these
persons are not relevant. If each person sustaining damage were obliged
to look for protection to the State from which such person is a national,
undue hardship would ensue.
In the Case concerning the Conservation and Sustainable
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Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean,10 4
the Tribunal, at the request of Chile and the European Community, on
December 20, 2000 formed a special chamber to deal with the dispute,
consisting of four judges of the Tribunal and one judge ad hoc. °5 This
has so far been the only case where one of the parties to the dispute is an
international organization, namely the European Community. 106  The
case, inter alia, concerns whether the European Community has
complied with its obligations under the Convention to ensure the
conservation of swordfish in the fishing activities undertaken by vessels
flying the flag of its Member States in the high seas adjacent to Chile's
exclusive economic zone. At the request of the parties, the time limits
for the proceedings continue to be suspended until January 1, 2009, with
both parties maintaining their right to revive them at any time.' 07
IV. Conclusion
In its eleven years of existence the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea has established a reputation for the expeditious and
efficient management of cases,'0 8 and has already made a substantial
contribution to the development of international law. 10 9 According to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea it has the competence
and means to deal with a wide range of disputes, and is well equipped to
discharge its functions speedily, efficiently and cost-effectively. The
total of fifteen cases, of which twelve were fisheries related and thirteen
104. See Case concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community), supra note
100.
105. See Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case on
Conservation of Swordfish Stocks between Chile and the European Community in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean before Special Chamber of the Tribunal (Dec. 21, 2000) (on
file with author).
106. The European Community became a party to the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea on April 1, 1998.
107. Statement by President Wolfrum at the Plenary of the 6 1st Session of the General
Assembly, supra note 44, at 4; see also, Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, Case on Conservation of Swordfish Stocks between Chile and the European
Community in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean Time-limits extended at the request of the
parties ( Jan. 8, 2004) (on file with author); see also Press Release, International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, Case between Chile and the European Community Concerning
the Conservation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean-The Special
Chamber adopts an order for a further extension of time-limits (Nov. 30, 2007) (on file
with author).
108. See Statement by President Wolfrum at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties,
supra note 26, at 5.
109. See also M. Kamto, "Regard sur la jurisprudence du tribunal international du
droit de la mer depuis son entree en fonctionnement (1997-2004)," Revue g~n~rale de
droit international public, 2005, Tome CVIX, p.828; see also Wolfrum, supra note 15, at
76.
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were introduced on the basis of the Tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction,
may not appear impressive. This record, however, does not compare
unfavourably to that of other international judicial bodies in the initial
stages of their existence.1 0 It should be borne in mind that the Tribunal
is a relatively new judicial body which is yet to fulfil its potential as the
specialized judicial organ of the international community for the
settlement of disputes relating to the law of the sea. "
The creation of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has
from the very beginning been subject to a certain degree of criticism as
being unnecessary and risking a fragmentation of international law. 12 It
has even been suggested that the establishment of the Tribunal has been a
"great mistake."'"1 3 It is certainly true that States, under the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, have a wide choice of forum for the settlement of
disputes, which has been significantly expanded by the creation of the
Tribunal. The evidence so far nevertheless suggests that a choice of
forum is more beneficial than harmful 1 4 and that the danger of
conflicting jurisdiction has been widely overestimated."l 5 Fragmentation
of the law of the sea has thus far not occurred, and the Tribunal also
makes every effort to keep abreast of the developments that take place in
other international judicial fora, in particular the International Court of
Justice.' 16
The relative paucity of cases brought before the Tribunal, and the
fact that it is thus underutilized is certainly a matter of concern for the
judges, but one over which they have little or no control.' 17 It could,
however, also be said that the relatively few cases of litigation among the
States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
a compliment to the work of the negotiators of the Convention.1 18
110. See Speech by Judge L. Dolliver M. Nelson, President of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the occasion of the visit to the Tribunal by Mr. Horst
K6hler, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, September 1, 2004, 4.
111. See Statement by President Wolfrum at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties,
supra note 20, at 76.
112. See Boyle, supra note 33, at 120; see also Boyle, supra note 36, at 37; see also
Klein, supra note 62, at 55; see also Rayfuse, supra note 63, at 686; see also Churchill,
supra note 7, at 416.
113. Jillaine Seymour, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Great
Mistake?, 13 INDIANA J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 1, 35 (2006).
114. See Boyle, supra note 33, at 54.
115. See Klein, supra note 62, at 59; see also Churchill, supra note 7, at 416; see also
Rayfuse, supra note 63, at 710-11.
116. See Judge Riidiger Wolfrum, supra note 44.
117. See Seymour, supra note 113, at 35.
118. See A. Serdy, "The paradoxical Success of UNCLOS Part XV: A Half-hearted
Reply to Rosemary Rayfuse", 36 VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY WORLD L. REV. 717 (2005).
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